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AMERICAN TRADE NEws HIGHLIGHTS
FOR SPRING, 2013
THE KEYSTONE XL: To CHOOSE
ECONOMIc TRIUMPH, OR
ENVIRONMENTAL DISASTER?
Sarah Bridges*DEPENDENCE on natural resources has been an increasing part
of U.S. history over the last century, and with it, reliance on un-
stable sources of the commodity and unpredictable economic ca-
tastrophes. Recently, the United States has sustained its dependence on
gas and petroleum products due in part to advances in technology, which
have opened access to more reserves of these resources. Today, areas
holding natural resources previously thought to be unrecoverable are be-
ing exploited regularly, including the coastal shelf, the shale regions, and
now, the Canadian oil sands. As Canada sought to develop, transport,
and market this massive source, it looked to the United States as its
strongest partner in trade and an equally strong consumer of petroleum
products. The development of the Keystone XL pipeline is one facet of
Canadian oil production, and its approval by the United States may prove
to be a facet of the countries' continued harmonious trade arrangement,
or its undoing.
I. BACKGROUND
A. CANADA-UNITED STATES TRADE RELATIONSHIP
Historically, the United States and Canada have enjoyed a symbiotic
trade relationship, which was memorialized and strengthened on January
2, 1988, when the two countries executed the Canada-U.S. Free Trade
Agreement (FTA).1 The FTA, effective a year later, eliminated many
tariffs completely, reduced non-tariff trade barriers, and provided a
mechanism for settling trade disputes. 2 Negotiations for the North
*Sarah received her J.D. cum laude from SMU Dedman School of Law in 2013.
Prior to beginning law school, she earned a Bachelor of Arts from Midwestern
State University. She would like to thank her fianc6 for his love and support
throughout law school.
1. Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Can, Jan. 2, 1988, 27 I.L.M. 293.
2. Id. arts. 401, 405-09, 1801-08.
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American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) ensued shortly after, and an
agreement binding the United States, Canada, and Mexico entered into
force on January 1, 1994.3 Under the FTA and NAFTA, the U.S-Cana-
dian border has witnessed an ever-increasing nigration of goods and ser-
vices, totaling over $596 billion in 2011.4
Due to an array of natural resources on both sides of the border, high
levels of consumption in each country, and provisions in both the FTA
and NAFTA, U.S.-Canadian energy trade has flourished, making the
countries' interaction "the closest energy relationship in the world."5
One crucial product involved in the energy trade is crude oil; Canada is
the largest exporter of crude oil to the United States.6 Virtually all-99
percent-of Canada's exported crude oil is imported by the United
States, with 70 percent of those imports being directed to refineries in the
Midwest.7 The energy trade is not one directional, as the United States is
a prime provider of natural gas and electricity to Canada.8
Recent developments in technology have empowered both countries to
expand their production of natural resources. Oil and gas production
companies have used horizontal drilling and hydraulic fracturing to open
up to 315 billion barrels of Canadian oil sands, and similar developments
are occurring in shale rocks across the United States.9 Advances in off-
shore drilling methods have made 88.5 billion barrels of oil off the coast
in the outer shelf of the United States recoverable,' 0 and similar offshore
expansions are occurring in the Atlantic offshore region in Canada." In
addition to the exchange of products, services are also being traded with
U.S.-based companies-including Shell, Devon, and Total, which all hold
prime spots in Canadian oil plays.12 While tens of thousands of Ameri-
cans working in Canada's lucrative oil and gas industry travel by plane,
pipelines are the main thoroughfares to transport crude oil.'3 But as a
3. North American Free Trade Agreement art. 2203, U.S.-Can.-Mex., Dec. 17, 1992,
32 I.L.M. 289 (1993).
4. Canada, OFFICE OF 11E U.S. TRADE RiPREISENTATIVE, http://www.ustr.gov/coun-
tries-regions/americas/Canada (last visited June 9, 2013).
5. North American Free Trade Agreement, supra note 3, arts. 601-09; Free Trade
Agreement, supra note 1, arts. 901-09; Canada-U.S. Energy Relations, Gov'r oF
CAN., http://www.canadainternational.gc.ca/san-diego/bilateral relations bilateral
es/energy-energie.aspx?lang=eng&view=d (last modified Jan. 24, 2013).
6. U.S. ENERGY INFo. ADMIN., CANADA 8 (revised Dec. 10, 2012), available at http://
www.eia.gov/countries/analysisbriefs/Canada/canada.pdf (noting that the United
States imported 2.7 million barrels of oil and petroleum products daily from Ca-
nada in 2011).
7. Id.
8. Canada-U.S. Energy Relations, supra note 5.
9. Id.
10. BUREAU OF OCEAN ENERGY MGMT., ASSSSMENT OF UNDISCOVEREDo TECIINI-
CALLY RECOVERABLE OIL AND GAs REsouRci-s OF TiHE NATION's OUTER CONTI-
NENTAL SIMF, 2011 (rev. Oct. 2012), available at http://www.boem.gov/Oil-and-
Gas-Energy-Program/Resource-Evaluation/Resource-Assessment/2011 -RA-
Assessments.aspx.
11. Canada-U.S. Energy Relations, supra note 5.
12. CANADA, supra note 6, at 5-7.
13. Canada-U.S. Energy Relations, supra note 5.
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recent report by the Energy Information Administration indicates, infra-
structure constraints in the midcontinent are forcing oil producers to in-
creasingly bypass this preferred method for transport by rail.14
B. THE BEGINNINGS OF THE KEYSTONE XL
The main objective of constructing the Keystone XL pipeline (Key-
stone XL) is to transport crude oil produced in the Canadian Midwest
from the U.S.-Canadian border to Steele City, Nebraska. From Ne-
braska, the existing Cushing Extension continues the delivery of crude
oil, with most bound for Gulf Coast refineries.' 5 The existing Keystone
pipeline and Cushing Extensions are primary portions of this project and
are being followed by more extensions in the Gulf Coast region currently
under construction. The proposed 875-mile Keystone XL would essen-
tially connect the heavy crude Canadian oil sands and Montana and
North Dakota based Bakken shale with existing refineries in the southern
United States.16
The regulatory beginning of the Keystone XL in the United States
commenced when TransCanada Keystone Pipeline, L.P. (TransCanada)
filed an application requesting a presidential permit for the pipeline on
September 19, 2008 (2008 Application). 7 TransCanada, a company
owned equally by affiliates of TransCanada Corporation, a Canadian
public company, and ConocoPhillips, a Delaware corporation,18 made
this application pursuant to President George W. Bush's Executive Order
13,337, signed April 30, 2004.19 In the Order, President Bush referred
applications for the construction of facilities at U.S. borders for the im-
port or export of petroleum products, coal, or other fuels from a foreign
country to the Secretary of State.20 The Order provides that once the
Secretary of State has received such an application, he is to submit the
application for review to the Secretary of Defense, Attorney General,
Secretary of the Interior, Secretary of Commerce, Secretary of Transpor-
tation, Secretary of Energy, Secretary of Homeland Security, and Admin-
14. CANADA, supra note 6, at 9.
15. U.S. DEP'T OF STATE BUREAU OF OCEANS & INT'L ENVTL. & SCIENTIFIC AF-
FAIRS, DRAFr SUPPLEMENTAL ENVIRONMENTAl IMPAcr STATEMENT FOR THE
KEYSTONE XL PROJECr 1.3.1 (Mar. 2013) (hereinafter 2013 Draft SEIS); see
About the Project, TRANSCANADA, http://keystone-xl.com/about/the-project/ (last
visited May 21, 2013).
16. 2013 Draft SEIS, supra note 15, at 1.2.
17. U.S. DEi'T OF STATE, APPLICATION OF KEYSTONE TRANSCANAIDA PIPEIINE, L.P.,
FOR A PRESIDENTIAL PERMIT Au-iiORIZING THE CONSTRUCTION, CONNECION,
OPERATION, AND MAINTENANCE OF PIPELINE FACILITIES FOR THE IMPORTATION
OF CRUDE OIL TO BE LOCATED AT THE UNITED STATES-CANADA BORDER, 2
(May 4, 2012), available at http://keystone-xl.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/11/kxl-
pp-application.pdf (hereinafter 2012 Application).
18. Public Notice 6422, 73 Fed. Reg. 65,713 (Nov. 4, 2008) (providing notice that the
Department of State had received an Application for a Permit for Pipeline Facili-
ties to be Constructed and Maintained on the Borders of the United States).
19. Exec. Order No. 13,337, 69 Fed. Reg. 25,299 (Apr. 30, 2004).
20. Id. § (1)(a); see 3 U.S.C. § 301 (1951) (granting general delegation powers of exec-
utive duties to the President).
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istrator of the Environmental Protection Agency.21 Additionally, the
Secretary is permitted to consult with state or local governments affected
by the application and to open the application to public comment.22
The Department of State took three years to consider the 2008 Appli-
cation, issuing its findings through its Final Environmental Impact State-
ment (2011 FEIS) on August 26, 2011.23 The relatively mild
environmental warnings in the 2011 FEIS concluded that a crude oil spill
would likely have no effect on the general public; 2 4 that no viable alterna-
tives to the Keystone XL existed in terms of substitute systems or differ-
ent pipeline routes;25 and that the imposition of fifty-seven project
specific conditions, which TransCanada agreed to, would result in the
project having a "degree of safety greater than any typically constructed
domestic oil pipeline system under current regulations." 2 6 Despite these
seemingly positive reviews and the extensive time spent considering the
proposal, immediate approval of the 2008 Application did not follow.
C. THE DENIAL OF THE 2008 APPLICATION
Although the Department of State concluded under the Obama Ad-
ministration in the 2011 FEIS that alternate pipeline routes were not via-
ble options, the Department announced in November of 2011 that it was
delaying its decision on the 2008 Application so it could consider alterna-
tive routes through Nebraska.27 The Department cited concern for the
potential impacts on the Sandhills area of Nebraskan and the state's un-
developed regulatory framework overseeing pipeline placement as the
reasons for prolonging the decision.2 9 Some speculate that politics and
bureaucracy were to blame for the delay. With the ensuing presidential
elections, critics-both pro- and anti-pipeline-saw the postponement as
an attempt to "avoid the heat from opposing interests-business lobbies
or environmental and health advocates-and to find a political middle
21. Exec. Order No. 13,337, 69 Fed. Reg. at § (1)(b)(ii).
22. Id. §§ (1)(e), (3)(a).
23. U.S. DE-P'T OF STATE, FINAL SUPPLEMENTAiL ENVIRONMENTAL IMPAcr STAT1-
MENT FOR THE KEYSTONE XL Pizojicr (2011) (hereinafter 2011 FEIS) (results of
study undertaking to analyze the environmental impacts that could result from the
approval of a Presidential Permit authorizing construction, operation, and mainte-
nance of the pipeline, consistent with the National Environmental Policy Act of
1969).
24. Id. § 3.13.5.
25. Id. § 4.2-3.
26. Id. at ES6 (noting that the special conditions pertained to regulating the pipeline
design and manufacturing, system construction and testing, and such other aspects
as maintenance, monitoring, reporting, and certification).
27. 2012 Application, supra, note 17, at 2; Press Release, U.S. Dep't of State, Keystone
XL Pipeline Project Review Process: Decision to Seek Additional Information
(Nov. 10, 2011), available at http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2011/11/176964.htm.
28. The Sandhills Region is a system of wetlands and shallow waterbeds that come
together to produce an environmentally-sensitive ecosystem.
29. Keystone XL Pipeline Project Review Process: Decision to Seek Additional Infor-
mation, supra note 27.
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ground."o30
Meanwhile, in Nebraska, Governor Dave Heineman called a special
session of the state legislature to address two bills pertaining to the pipe-
line.3 ' During this time, the legislature adopted and the Governor ap-
proved Legislative Bill 1 (adopting the Major Oil Pipeline Siting Act and
declaring an emergency such that the legislation took effect once passed
and approved) and Legislative Bill 4 (granting authority for the Nebraska
Department of Environmental Quality and Governor to participate in the
federal environmental impact statements), essentially resolving the De-
partment of State's cited concerns. 32 Both laws passed by unanimous
vote. 33
In December of 2011, Congress placed a section in the Temporary Pay-
roll Tax Cut Continuation Act of 2011 requiring President Barack Obama
to determine whether the Keystone XL would serve the national interest
within sixty days of the bill's enactment. 34 Within approximately one
month, in a show of unilateral presidential power not frequently seen in
the United States, President Obama denied the 2008 Application, ex-
plaining simply that the Department of State felt sixty days was an "insuf-
ficient period to obtain and assess the necessary information."35 This
denial did not preclude subsequent permit applications for similar under-
takings, however, and TransCanada did not merely abandon its multi-bil-
lion dollar project.36 The denial put the process of state involvement the
Nebraska legislature had provided for in Legislative Bill 4 on hold,
prompting the state legislature to pass Legislative Bill 1161, which al-
lowed the Nebraska Department of Environmental Quality to continue
evaluating proposed pipeline routes.37
30. John M. Broder & Dan Frosch, U.S. Review Expected to Delay Oil Pipeline Past
the Election, N.Y. TIMEs, Nov. 11, 2011, at Al. As polarizing as a decision either
direction might have been for President Obama's campaign, the middle ground
may have been just as polarizing. For example, the President of the American
Petroleum Institute commented, "This is all about politics and keeping a radical
constituency, opposed to any and all oil and gas development, in the president's
camp in 2012. Whether it will help the president retain his job is unclear but it will
cost thousands of shovel-ready opportunities for American workers." On the
other end of the spectrum, an international environmental activist asserted "This
decision just puts off a green light . . . I'm a little dismayed at suggestions that this
kick-the-can decision means environmentalists will enthusiastically back President
Obama in 2012. Is the price of an environmentalist's vote a year's delay on envi-
ronmental catastrophe? Excuse me, no." Id.
31. Letter from Dave Heineman, Governor of Neb., to President Barack Obama, and
Hillary Rodham Clinton, Secretary of State (Jan. 22, 2013), available at http://
www.governor.nebraska.gov/news/2013/01/docs/0122_Pipeline-Approval.pdf.
32. L.B. 1, 102d Leg., 1st Spec. Sess. (Neb. 2011); L.B. 4, 102d Leg., 1st Spec. Sess.
(Neb. 2011).
33. Neb. Legislature Unicameral Info. Office, Two Pipeline Measures Approved; Leg-
islature Adjourns, UNICAMERAL UPDATE (Nov. 22, 2011), http://update.legislature.
ne.gov/?p=5458.
34. H.R. 3765, 112th Cong. § 501 (2011); Public Notice 7786, 77 Fed. Reg. 5,614 (Feb.
3, 2012).
35. Public Notice 7786, supra note 34.
36. 2012 Application, supra, note 17, at 3.
37. L.B. 1161, 102d Leg., 2d Sess. (Neb. 2011).
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II. CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS
A. THE 2012 APPLICATION
On May 4, 2012, TransCanada submitted a second application (2012
Application) to the Department of State for a modified route of the Key-
stone XL pipeline.38 This proposal cut the length of the pipeline by over
500 miles.39 Additionally, despite the approving undertone in the 2011
FEIS, the 2012 Application avoided the environmentally sensitive
Sandhills region and circumvented two states that the pipeline proposed
in the 2008 Application would have crossed.40
In January of 2013, Governor Heineman informed the Obama adminis-
tration that he had received a new proposed pipeline route for the Key-
stone XL, which was scrutinized by the Nebraska Department of
Environmental Quality and had his ultimate approval. 41 In his letter, the
Governor noted that the new route avoided the sensitive areas of Ne-
braska's ecosystem; that the pipeline would generate hundreds of millions
of dollars in immediate revenue, as well as over ten thousand dollars in
property tax revenues yearly; and that TransCanada agreed to take any
responsibility, financial or regulatory, that a spill associated with the pipe-
line could cause. 42
The Department of State released a Draft Supplemental Environmen-
tal Impact Statement (2013 Draft SEIS) on March 1, 2013.43 The 2013
Draft SEIS evaluated the changes in TransCanada's proposal since the
2008 Application and summarized the pipeline's possible environmental
effects, including socioeconomic impact, consequences of oil spills, and
effects on local species from the American Burying Beetle to the Whoop-
ing Crane.44 Except for the shorter pipeline length and rerouting in Ne-
braska, the results of the 2013 and 2011 statements are similar. Notably,
the 2013 Draft SEIS predicts that the construction of the newly proposed
route will generate 42,000 jobs and approximately $2.05 billion in earn-
ings. 45 These figures are significantly higher than the 2011 FEIS quote of
5,000 jobs and approximately $350 million in earnings. 46 The 2013 Draft
SEIS is currently the subject of a forty-five day public comment period,
38. 2012 Application, supra, note 17; Public Notice No. 7876, 77 Fed. Reg. 27,533 (May
10, 2012).
39. 2013 Draft SEIS, supra note 15, at ES6.
40. Id. at 6-7. Additionally, the number of perennial rivers the pipeline would cross
had been reduced to fifty-six, one-sixth the originally-proposed number; approxi-
mately 1,073 waterbodies, however, would still be crossed. Press Release, U.S.
Dep't of State, State Department Releases Draft Supplemental Environmental
Impact Statement on the Proposed Keystone CL Pipeline (Mar. 1, 2013) available
at http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2013/03/205547.htm.
41. Letter from Dave Heineman, supra note 31.
42. Id.
43. 2013 Draft SEIS, supra note 15; Public Notice No. 8258, 78 Fed. Reg. 18,665 (Mar.
27, 2013).
44. 2013 Draft SEIS, supra note 15, at 14.
45. Id. at 16.
46. 2011 FEIS, supra note 23, at 25; 2013 Draft SEIS, supra note 15, at 16.
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after which a public meeting will be held. 4 7 The State Department will
take the public comments collected and the discussions at the meeting
into consideration while drafting a final environmental impact statement
summarizing the Department's findings. 4 8 President Obama will use this
statement to guide his final decision regarding the pipeline.
III. POTENTIAL RESULTS
The construction of a cross-country, multi-billion-dollar facility could
not occur without leaving a lasting impact on the countries it touches, and
such is the case with the Keystone XL, both economically and environ-
mentally. The potential effects of this undertaking are extraordinary in
two ways: they expand past the borders of the two collaborating coun-
tries, and they persist even if TransCanada's 2012 Application is denied
and the Keystone XL is never built.
A. LOCAL EFFECTS
Once constructed, the Keystone XL would bring an immense amount
of crude oil to the United States each day, with estimates ranging from
700,000 to 830,000 barrels per day, an amount which, once processed, has
the potential to reduce current imports from other countries by 7 per-
cent.4 9 TransCanada has committed to dedicating 25 percent of the pipe-
line's capacity to transporting the oil produced from the North Dakota
and Montana Bakken shales to southern refineries-a solution to what
many American operating companies consider a crisis.50 In addition to
increasing the supply of petroleum products, the construction of the pipe-
line would bring other economic benefits to the United States. States
would have the potential to generate additional income through pipeline
construction, property taxes, sales and use taxes, and general economic
stimulus from the influx of workers who would require housing, food, and
other necessities. Additionally, with unemployment rates still close to 8
percent, the American economy would benefit from the construction jobs
described above and from continued prosperous operations in the Cana-
dian oil sands, where one out of three jobs generated in the future is
predicted to be filled by an American.5 1
47. Public Notice No. 8258, supra note 43.
48. Id.
49. 2013 Draft SEIS, supra note 15, at 1; John M. Broder, et al., Obama Faces Risks in
Pipeline Decision, N.Y. TIMEs, Feb. 18, 2013, at Bl; see U.S. Imports by Country of
Origin, U.S. ENERGY INFo. ADMIN. (Mar. 15, 2013), http://www.eia.gov/dnav/pet/
pet -.move impcus a2_nus.ep00_imOmbbl a.htm.
50. Keystone XL Brings a Secure Supply of Oil to the United States, TRANSCANADA,
http://keystone-xl.com/aboutlenergy-security/ (last visited June 10, 2013). Because
the recent oil and gas boom in the northern shale states is unprecedented, very
little infrastructure exists to transport petroleum products from the source of pro-
duction to existing refineries. Without a mode of transportation, the fate of the
northern shales is questionable.
51. U.S. DEr'T OF LABOR, BUREAU OF1 LA13OR STAinsFiJcs, LAnoR FORCE STATISTICS
1v CuRRENT POPULATION SuRvEY (Mar. 21, 2013, 3:43:38 PM), available at http://
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Still, the Keystone XL as proposed in the 2012 Application could ignite
or exacerbate significant environmental concerns. Besides the construc-
tion's inherent interruption of the relatively untouched ecosystem of the
Midwest, the pipeline brings additional risks, including oil leaks and
spills, contamination of waterbodies, and rising greenhouse gas emis-
sions. 52 Further, extracting oil from the tar sands involves unattractive
open-pit mining and necessitates a process that is "dirtier" than tradi-
tional oil production, releasing more carbon monoxide into the environ-
ment.53 The 2013 Draft SEIS estimates that extracting, shipping, and
processing oil from tar sands produces 5 to 19 percent more greenhouse
gas emissions than traditional crude oil.5 4 But it also notes that denial of
any pipeline permit-including the Keystone XL-will not impact the
rate at which operators are developing the tar sands.55 In affected areas,
the pipeline will likely bring noise, localized pollution, and traffic conges-
tion; however, all the viable alternative means of transporting the prod-
ucts-e.g., train, truck, or barge-not only share these effects, but would
require more time to construct, utilize more U.S. land, and employ fewer
American workers. 56 Because the denial of the Keystone XL permit
would not affect the continued U.S. demand for crude oil, producers
would be forced to turn to these unappealing-and probably more expen-
sive-options. 57 Given the economic reality and the likelihood that deny-
ing TransCanada's permit would not alter the environmental effects
inherent in petroleum production, working with TransCanada to ensure
the best possible means of pipeline construction and maintenance seems
the most beneficial solution for the United States.
B. INTERNATIONAL EFFECTS
1. If the 2012 Application is Approved
Looking beyond the U.S. border, the Keystone XL could bring lasting
changes to international relations, both between the United States and
Canada and beyond. Canada and the United States maintain a constant,
mutually-beneficial trade of goods and services that has been called the
"greatest bilateral trading relationship in the world."58 Approving the
pipeline would be a show of good faith, strengthening U.S.-Canadian
data.bls.gov/timeseries/LNS14000000; Keystone XL Brings a Secure Supply of Oil
to the United States, supra note 50.
52. 2013 Draft SEIS, supra note 15, at 14, 16.
53. About Tar Sands, 2012 OI1 SIHALE & TAR SANDS PROGRAMMATIC EIS, http://
ostseis.anl.gov/guide/tarsands/ (last visited June 10, 2013) (a website for public in-
formation operated by the U.S. Department of the Interior, Bureau of Land Man-
agement in conjunction with an environmental impact statement it generated
pertaining to tar sand in the United States).
54. 2013 Draft SEIS, supra note 15, at 14.
55. Id. at 19-20.
56. Id. at 20.
57. Id.
58. The Canada-U.S. Trade and Investment Partnership, Gov'-r of CAN., http://
www.canadainternational.gc.ca/san-diegolbilateral-relations-bilaterales/commer-
cial relationscommerciales.aspx?lang=eng&view=d (last modified Nov. 26,2012).
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bonds even more, and reducing U.S. dependence on other less amenable
trade partners.59 With the massive involvement of U.S. producers as in-
ternational oil companies developing Canadian resources, including
Chevron, ConocoPhillips, Devon Energy, ExxonMobil, BP, Shell, and
Total, the U.S. should promote projects that would bring added benevo-
lence from the Canadian government.60
Additionally, added oil imports from the United States' northern
neighbor would reduce dependence on imports of petroleum from
other-often turbulent-foreign sources. Approving the pipeline could
fulfill President Obama's goal of decreasing dependence on oil from the
Middle East and Venezuela, which produces crude oil with a heavy grade
similar in composition to Canadian crude.61 While not completely elimi-
nating U.S. dependence on foreign oil, the pipeline could be an important
step in breaking free from the whims of the Organization of Petroleum
Exporting Countries. 62
2. If the 2012 Application is Denied
A denial of the 2012 Application would have lasting international con-
sequences, even past the local effects of increased oil transportation costs,
lost potential jobs and income, and perpetration of the petroleum supply
and demand deficit. Given the established trade regime between Canada
and the United States and the importance of the oil sands to Canada's
economy, refusal to permit the Keystone XL could forever alter the coun-
tries' trade relationship. Canada has invested over $100 billion in the oil
sands, and plans to use the Keystone XL to propel this "key driver in
economic development." 6 3 Alison Redford, the Alberta Premier, the ex-
ecutive head of the province producing the billions of dollars of oil in
question, has stated that hindering this operation "would fundamentally
change the [Canada-United States] relationship," implying that decades
of Canadian-U.S. integration and economic cooperation would be thrown
into question by a permit denial.M
Arguably, the United States has already committed to supporting this
Canadian undertaking; chapter nine of the FTA begins with the
explanation:
This chapter . . . will secure Canada's access to the United States
market for energy goods. The two countries have recognized that
they have a common interest in securing access to each other's mar-
59. See Broder, et al., supra note 49.
60. CANADA, supra note 6, at 3.
61. Press Release, Barack Obama & Joe Biden, New Energy for America (Jan. 2009)
(available at http://energy.gov/sites/prod/files/edg/media/ObamaNewEnergy_08
04.pdf).
62. See Broder, et al., supra note 49.
63. Id.; Canada-U.S. Energy Relations, supra note 5.
64. Shawn McCarthy, Pipeline Denial Would 'Fundamentally Change' Relations with
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ket and enhancing their mutual security of supply. They have, there-
fore, built on their existing. . . rights and obligations and agreed that,
as each other's best customers, they should get fair treatment should
there be any controls on energy commodities.65
The countries echoed this assertion in the NAFTA, wherein they recog-
nized that "it is desirable to strengthen the important role that trade in
energy and basic petrochemical goods plays in the free trade area and to
enhance this role through sustained and gradual liberalization." 6 6 But
the same NAFTA article also emphasizes that having competitive and
viable energy sectors is important for each countries' furtherance of their
own individual interests; if disappointed by President Obama's decision,
Canada may seek to further its own interests elsewhere. 67
Presidential power this significant and unchecked is rare, and there are
concerns that President Obama's commitments made on the campaign
trail and in his recent inaugural address to attack climate change will un-
duly influence this major decision. 68 As said by Canada's ambassador to
the United States, "the decision has to be made on merit and not noise.
And if people in Canada perceive that the decision is made on noise,
there will be extreme disappointment." 6 9 Canada's growing relationships
with other nations, particularly China, are not merely noise, and should
the 2012 Application be denied, it is likely the country will look to these
different markets. The Chinese, for example, have massive investments
in the Canadian oil sands that would naturally encourage the nation to
take measures supporting overseas trade with Canada; Chinese power
companies PetroChina, Sinopec, the China National Petroleum Corpora-
tion, and the China National Offshore Oil Corporation have all invested
in the oil sands, including full acquisition of some projects. 70 And, as said
by the Vice President of the Canadian Association of Petroleum Produc-
ers, "Canada, right now, with our potential growth in energy, is looking
for security of demand wherever that might be throughout the world."7
The combination of Canada's horizon of new potential energy trade part-
ners and bitter taste from this experience with the United States could
bring the end of the "closest energy relationship in the world." 72
IV. CONCLUSION
While the strength of U.S.-Canadian trade has endured and even flour-
ished for decades, Canada cannot be expected to sit on its cash cow and
risk continuing localized gluts in oil prices. Like the United States has in
65. Free Trade Agreement, supra note 1, at introduction to Ch. 9.
66. North American Free Trade Agreement, supra note 3, art. 601.
67. Id.
68. John M. Broder, Governor of Nebraska Backs Route for Pipeline, N.Y. TIMEs, Jan.
23, 2013, at All.
69. Broder, et al., supra note 49.
70. CANADA, supra note 6, at 3.
71. Broder, et al, supra note 49.
72. Canada-U.S. Energy Relations, supra note 5.
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its booming shale plays, Canada will capitalize on its oil sands, and inevi-
tably require and seek an active market for its products. As the State
Department has conceded, a U.S. refusal of the Keystone XL is unlikely
to deter negative environmental effects from the oil sand's development,
as operators will likely to continue to exploit the resource, and alterna-
tively, equally harmful modes of transportation will likely bring it into the
United States. The direct economic gains the United States would see in
construction spending and increased employment are a small portion of
the benefits the Keystone XL would reap, with such benefits paling in
comparison to the likely indirect gains-ranging from strengthening its
relationship with its strongest trade ally to reducing dependence on coun-
tries with which interactions have been tempestuous. Given the inevita-
bility of the environmental impact President Obama seeks to avoid and
the potentially disastrous consequences of damaging a prime trade rela-
tionship, the Obama Administration should undoubtedly approve the
TransCanada's Keystone XL application.
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